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Abstract 
Large-scale systemic state capture, which is the root of widespread corruption, is 
acquiring such proportions in Serbia that it may undermine the success of its transition. 
‘State capture’ is defined as any group or social strata, external to the state, that seizes 
decisive influence over state institutions and policies for its own interests and against the 
public good. The appropriation of state institutions and functions by the political party 
leadership is being carried out at an alarming rate in Serbia, as supported by research 
data in this paper by Vesna Pesic, an International Policy Research Fellow. The 
phenomenon of state capture is explored in depth looking at its background, prevalence 
and variety of mechanisms in Serbia today. The author concludes with policy options and 
recommendations to help curb corruption, address the deep mistrust expressed by the 
Serbian people about their political system, and to pave the way for democratic transition.    
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STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION 
IN SERBIA 
VESNA PESIC
* 
Introduction 
Large-scale and systemic state capture, which is the root of widespread corruption, is acquiring 
such proportions in Serbia that it may undermine the success of its transition. This phenomenon 
of state capture has to be differentiated from the corrupt actions of giving and receiving bribery 
(‘administrative corruption’) and connected with the institutional and legal weaknesses of the 
social system. Recent literature
1 defines state capture as the ‘seizure’ of laws to the advantage of 
corporate business via influential political links in the parliament and government. When the 
state is captured in this manner, the whole legal system becomes the opposite of what it should 
be, because it works to the advantage of illegal interests that are dressed up in a legal form.
2 For 
the purpose of this policy paper, I have defined ‘state capture’ as any group or social strata, 
external to the state, that exercises decisive influence over state institutions and policies for its 
own interests against the public good. I will show that in Serbia, political parties are the main 
agents being used to appropriate state and public assets. They are systematically expanding their 
political and financial power, influence and ability to employ their relatives and party cronies, 
and promote the personal and corporate interests of the political and economic elites in control 
behind the scene. The appropriation of state institutions and functions by the political party 
leadership is being carried out by the use of a variety of mechanisms, which I will explain using 
my research data. How the citizens of Serbia perceive the role of the parties in state capture and 
corruption will be presented using a survey of public opinion conducted specifically for this 
paper. I will conclude by presenting a list of policies that should be applied to reduce or 
neutralise the captured state phenomenon. 
1.  The extent of the problem 
During the first two transition years after the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, political 
corruption in Serbia seemed to decline. The government was not the centre of corruption as was 
the case in the previous regime.
3 When the first democratic Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, 
                                                 
* Vesna Pesic is a grant recipient of the International Policy Fellowship Programme (IPF) of the Open 
Society Institute in Budapest. Research for this project was supported by the Open Society Institute – with 
the contribution of the International Policy Fellowship Programme of OSI-Budapest. Ms Pesic holds a 
PhD in sociology and is President of the Center for Peace and Democratic Development. She was elected 
to the Serbian Parliament in the country’s last elections in January 2007. 
1 See for example J. Hellman, G. Jones, and D. Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, 
Corruption and Influence in Transition, World Bank Policy Research Paper 2444, September 2000; 
Daniel Kaufman, “Rethinking Governance Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy”, World Bank 
Institute, Discussion Draft, March, 2003; Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann, “The Inequality of 
Influence” (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/inequality_influence.pdf ). 
2 For more about the concept of state capture, see Nemanja Nenadic, “Tycoons and Corruption”, Politika, 
12 November 2006.  
3 The beginning of the transition in Serbia counts from the fall of the regime of Slobodan Miloseivc, 
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was assassinated and his government
4 was forced to resign under the pressure of his political 
rivals (from the same victorious coalition which took power in October 2000 against Milosevic, 
and which was backed by the ‘old forces’), state capture was renewed together with the rise of 
party influence on the state institutions.
5 After the elections in December 2003 and after a new 
government was created in March 2004, state capture began to reach alarming proportions – a 
trend that has continued for the past two and a half years. The extent of political corruption is 
corroborated by the World Bank report on patterns and trends of corruption in all transition 
countries in the 2002-05 period.
6  The research shows that some transition countries have 
recorded continued success in fighting corruption (Georgia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia made headway with regard to all dimensions, while Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine and 
Latvia made progress along some dimensions). On the other hand, some countries, including 
Serbia, Albania, the Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan, experienced an increase in corruption 
after 2002 with respect to monitored indicators. Serbia has suffered both an increase in ‘petty’ 
i.e. administrative, corruption (bribery)
7 and state capture, which is qualified as ‘grand and 
systemic corruption’ rooted in political corruption and uncontrolled powers of the political elite. 
With regard to higher levels of state capture, Serbia finds itself in the same group as Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FYR of Macedonia.  
The Serbian citizens’ perceptions of corruption coincide with the World Bank’s research results 
and the TI (Transparency International) CPI rank. The data of the survey conducted for this 
policy paper (see Annex I) show that Serbia’s citizens think corruption is widespread and that it 
has increased in recent years. When asked about the proportions of corruption, only 3% of those 
polled think it is minor, 34% qualify it as considerable, while 53% perceive it as widespread. As 
many as 56% of the respondents think corruption has risen in the past two years, while merely 
19% are of the view that it has decreased (the rest had no opinion). The answers to the question: 
“During which government has corruption been the greatest?” yielded similar percentages: 51% 
said it was never greater than in the Milosevic era, while 25% said it was greatest now. Only 9% 
think corruption was at its highest during the first post-Milosevic government (led by Prime 
Minister Djindjic) and 5% think it was the highest when Prime Minister Zivkovic led the same 
government after Djindjic’s assassination.
8  
Following the change in government, there was a shift in priorities leading to a more old-styled 
manner of governance, expressed in the political/party control of the police, the security 
intelligence agency, the media, and the judiciary, bringing back the old cadres to positions in 
                                                 
4 After the assassination, the government remained the same and only the Prime Minister was elected – 
Zoran Zivkovic, the Vice-President of the Democratic Party and Djindjic’s close collaborator.  
5 This is not to say that there was significantly less corruption in Serbia during the first (Djindjic’s) 
government. Rather, it is to say that the first government and its ministers, as public institutions of the 
highest influence, had not yet been captured by the party elite’s interests, nor were public appointments 
yet based exclusively on party criteria. Extreme appointment manipulation did not yet exist as a major 
link for the appropriation of the public interests. The ‘party state’ had not yet been created.  
6 Anti-corruption in Transition 3, Who is Succeeding…and Why?, James H. Anderson and Cheryl W. 
Gray, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2006 
7 This research has also shown one positive trend: there was a reduction in the percentage of profit given 
to bribery. It was reported that this was due to smaller amounts being asked for bribery. Although the 
requests are becoming more frequent, the total amount of corruption was lower.  
8 I count only two governments after Milosevic: one of Djindjic, and the other of Kostunica. Some people 
claim that there were three governments. They include the Zivkovic government as a separate one. Since 
Zivkovic as Prime Minister did not change the Djindjic government from the personnel point of view, nor 
did he introduce changes in policy, and since it only lasted from March to November 2003, I have not 
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state organs. Whereas the first Djindjic government
9 ambitiously and enthusiastically 
concentrated on enabling Serbia to integrate with the EU as soon as possible, enthusiasm for the 
EU integration process noticeably ebbed after the second government came to power. A rightist 
clerical-nationalist party has played the leading role in the coalition government set up in March 
2004.
10 Adverse to western values, it has placed commitment to EU integration on a back 
burner.
11 
The second transition government continued with the passing of a number of anti-corruption 
laws,
12 contributing to a trend towards improvement in Serbia’s position on the TI rating score 
during the period of 2003-06 (Serbia had not been measured prior to these years). The most 
recent publication of the TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2006 shows that Serbia has 
slightly improved its position, rising from a 97-103 ranking to a 90-92 ranking (together with 
Suriname and Gabon), with a CPI of 3.0 (it was 2.7 for 2004 and 2.8 for 2005) among 163 
countries. This grade is still very low and signifies endemic corruption (5.0 means that 
corruption has been reduced to a somewhat bearable level). A comparison with the ex-socialist 
countries shows that the best are Estonia with 6.7, Slovenia with 6.4 and Hungary with 5.2, 
while Albania (2.6), Russia (2.5) and Belarus (2.1) have the worst positions. Serbia is in the 
bottom half of the 20 ex-socialist countries; it has the 13th position on the list. Its grade is only 
slightly better than the worst and substantially worse than the best countries.  
Although Kostunica’s government has passed a number of laws which have had some effect on 
the country’s rating, adequate institutional reforms have not been established to ensure 
accountability, transparency, rule of law, public sector effectiveness and merit-based public 
office appointments. The implementation of some laws was postponed or had no great 
consequence. Rather, the government has focused on reviving nationalist values, resolving the 
“Serbian national issue” and preserving the staff and corruptive institutional structures that 
better serve such objectives. Reforms of the state institutions have merely been rhetorical. 
Insufficient encouragement has been given to the competitiveness of the economic and political 
systems. New decrees have extended discretionary decision-making methods.
13 The 
privatisation of the big public companies has not yet begun.
14 The effectiveness of regulatory 
institutions has been sabotaged and the implementation of the Law on Auditing State 
                                                 
9 In the Serbian public’s mind, the assassination of Zoran Djindjic was understood to be the resistance of 
the old cadres in security institutions to his intention to modernise Serbia and prepare the country to join 
the EU as soon as possible. His cooperation with the Hague Tribunal crimes was part of his threat to 
reform the military and secret police and bring in new administrative people. 
10 It is the Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) whose president is Vojislav Kostunica, presently Prime 
Minister of Serbia, and ex-President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
11 This proves that the EU has stopped negotiations with Serbia about the S&A agreement because of the 
lack of political will to extradite Ratko Mladic and others accused of war crimes to the ICTY.  
12 The Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest was passed in April 2004; the Law on Free Access 
to Information, November 2004; the Law on the State Auditing Institution, at the end of 2005; the Law on 
the Protection of Competition – the “Anti-Monopoly law,” September 2005; while the Ombudsman Law, 
and the Anti-corruption Strategy were passed by Parliament in December 2005. 
13 Ex-minister of Finance, Bozidar Djelic, says that the new wave of politisation of public institutions has 
led to the unilateral increase in discretional decision-making by the Government (unsupported by law or 
Parliamentary decision) regarding different types of taxes (excise tax on petroleum, customs tariffs, etc.). 
These were previously regulated by law. See Kada cemo ziveti bolje (When We Will Live Better), 
Sluzbeni Glasnik at al., Belgrade, 2006.  
14 Under considerable pressure by the International Monetary Fund to start the privatisation of the public 
companies, the Serbian Government’s strategy is to begin with the partial privatization of the Serbian 
Petroleum Industry (Naftna industrija Srbije – NIS), which will take place in 2007.  4 | VESNA PESIC 
Institutions and the Ombudsperson Law has been delayed. The Anti-Corruption National 
Strategy passed in December 2005 still lacks an institutional framework; specific action plans 
have not yet been drafted.  
The weakening of the European orientation of the Serbian transition has been accompanied by 
the rebuilding by the political and business elite
15 of ’state capture’ mechanisms. They have 
been able to ‘seize control’ of state institutions, exercise immense influence and amass 
considerable wealth. The phenomenon of state capture has been responsible for large-scale 
growing corruption and has seriously jeopardised public interest and transition in Serbia. 
Although transition in the economic sphere (mainly on the macroeconomic level and 
privatisation) has continued, institution-building in political, judiciary and administrative 
systems has been delayed, creating the opportunity for state capture.  
The visible consequence of the deficiencies described above has been the continual corruption 
affairs appearing in the news during the past three years. All cases have been at ministry level. 
The greatest number has been connected with the ‘finance party’ (G17 Plus). Scandals have 
included: the privatisation procedure of the National Savings Bank;
16 a bribery situation 
publicly known as the ‘Brief Case Affair’ involving the Vice-Governor of the National Bank of 
Serbia; the gross manipulation of a mineral water company privatisation; graft in army 
procurement and the unauthorised commitment for the purchase of a satellite for monitoring 
security zones around Kosovo. Other cases of suspected corruption having potential million-
dollar damages for society involve the import of electricity (owners of the import company are 
said in public to be financiers of the biggest political parties), the import of petroleum from 
Syria and the buying of railway cars without tender and procurement procedures.
17  
None of these affairs has been resolved by legal process and the government ‘reacted’ with 
silence. The president of the Anti-corruption Council of the Government of Serbia, the advisory 
body founded by the Djindjic government to deal with this problem, has estimated recently that 
the level of corruption in Serbia is once again at the level it was before October 5
th (when 
Milosevic was in power). She pointed out that during the last three years there has been no 
audited National Final Budget Statement. She warned the public that the National Investment 
Plan (NIP) launched by the Minister of Finance and supported by the Government has been 
passed in a corrupt manner – without law for its implementation and control – by avoiding legal 
procedures and by giving discretional decision-making to a group of ministers. She predicted 
that the corruption in the country will rise significantly if the NIP is implemented.  
Recent events related to the preparation, approval process and content of the new Constitution 
of Serbia confirm my initial hypothesis about ’state capture’ by the political/party elite. In mid 
September 2006, leaders of the four biggest parties
18 agreed literally overnight
19 on their 
                                                 
15 Research into the origin of the present-day economic elite indicates that it has been recruited from 
socialist companies beginning in 1989. Their former directors, experts and managers, once part of 
nomenclature, are the ‘tycoons’ of today (see Mladen Lazic, “Recruitment of the New Economic and 
Political Elites”, Republika, June 2006).  
16 The whole case, in detail, was presented and published by the Council Against Corruption of the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, in Serbian and English: Corruption, Power, State, Part two, 
prepared by Verica Barac and Ivan Zlatic, Res Republika, Belgrade, 2005.  
17 For a description of the corruption affairs, see Okupacija u 26 meseci 2004-2006 (Occupation in 26 
Months, 2004-2006). Centar za Modernu politiku (Center for Modern Politics), Belgrade, 2006.  
18  These four parties are: the Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) of Vojislav Kostunica, the Democratic 
Party (DP) of Boris Tadic who is also President of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) of Vojislav 
Seselj (which is the biggest individual party in the Parliament), and G17 Plus of Mladjan Dinkic, 
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Constitution Proposal. Without a single day of public debate, based on the decisions of the party 
leaders, Parliament passed the Proposal and called for a referendum for its approval. Even the 
members of the Parliament never received the Proposal, nor did they have a chance to discuss it 
in session when adopted. Citizens and their organisations did not have a chance to debate it 
either. Among items that reinforce capture state mechanisms of the political parties in the 
Constitution, MP mandates belong to the parties. In Article 102 it is stated that “the MP is free 
to (…) irrevocably put his mandate at the disposal of the party on whose list he was elected as 
MP”.
20 In addition, the immunity rights for the MPs have been broadened. These changes will 
strengthen the political power of the party elite and its interests (i.e. executive power) and 
additionally degrade Parliament and the MPs’ responsibility to the constituents’ interests by re-
confirming their impunity. The public has given the new Constitution the name “The 
Functionary’s Constitution”. The legitimacy of this public reputation of the Constitution was 
soon demonstrated when the Basic Law on the Implementation of the Constitution was on the 
Parliament’s agenda. The parties made a ‘deal’ that they would vote for the Law only if, during 
the first session of the new Parliament (after the January elections), the heads of the two 
independent institutions would be replaced: the Governor of the National Bank of Serbia and the 
Ombudsman for Information.
21 
The new Constitution will not help curb ‘state capture’ and its damaging consequences. It will 
not make political leadership accountable to the public. Even worse, judicial independence is 
not guaranteed by preventing party/political influence over the courts, the police and public 
prosecution. Getting to the roots of corruptive practices in governance is crucial to Serbia’s 
ability to break the grip of rigid institutional structures constructed to protect vested interests, so 
that it might proceed successfully in the European Union enlargement process. However, these 
two clear mandates in the new Constitution will make it difficult to eliminate the parties’ use of 
public offices for their private interests rather than for representing constituents’ interests and 
for the pursuit of the public good.
22 
2.  The State Capture model in Serbia and its mechanisms 
From the point of view of system theory, state capture is caused by a weak functional 
differentiation within the social system. Boundaries between the subsystems do not exist or are 
porous. Power and goods from the economic sub-system are convertible for influence and goods 
from the political sub-system and vice versa, depending on where the dominant power of the 
social system lies. The dominant power in Serbia is still located within the political system.  
                                                                                                                                               
19 The official justification for such a hasty adoption of the new Constitution was to “preserve Kosovo in 
Serbia” by saying in the Constitution that Kosovo is part of Serbia. 
20 The President of Transparency Serbia, Vladimir Goati, commented that Article 102 of the new 
Constitution (which gave mandates to the parties) singled out Serbia as the only European country to have 
such a rule. This type of rule only exists in some Asian countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan and India).  
21 The mandate of the Governor of the NBS does not coincide with the elections or changes in the 
Parliament or government. The same refers to the Ombudsman for Information whose work became 
influential and highly appreciated by the public. The impression is that somebody from the government 
asked for his removal because he performed his public role in a proper and independent way (he caught 
the Minister of Police in a lie).  
22 To protect the parties’ interest in having control of the mandates in the Serbian Parliament, the three 
main parties (the DPS of Kostunica, DP of Tadic, and SRP of Seselj/Nikolic) decided to disengage the 
sovereignty of the people by giving the ownership of all mandates to the parties. The real user of 
sovereignty (which should stem from the citizens) will be the parties’ leaderships, enabling them to 
exercise state authority, if not directly, then indirectly by owning the MPs’ mandates. See Aleksandar 
Molnar, Republika, 24 October 2006, pp. XXII, XXII. 6 | VESNA PESIC 
The most important ’capturing’ agents are the political party leaderships who have seized huge 
state property including public companies, public offices and institutions for their own interest. 
The second important agent is the 10-15 richest tycoons of the country who finance all the 
relevant parties, thereby becoming part of the system.
23 Both elites, in collusion with each other, 
have established a system of integrating their influences, interests, and services for mutual gain. 
This collusion has created an oligarchic social structure in Serbia that undermines effective 
institution-building and the rule of law. The main chains of influence and the connection of 
interests are demonstrated in the Model of State Capture in Serbia (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Model of State Capture in Serbia   
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Figure 1 shows the mutual dependence between the political and business elite and how the 
tycoons help sustain their political positioning by financing all of the relevant parties. In return, 
the ruling parties protect economic markets, fix tenders and auctions, and pass favourable 
legislation for the tycoons. It also shows how government, parliament and parties are connected 
with public companies and public institutions as their own shares of power. The (black) links 
which go from the government to the parties show that the position of the ruling parties in the 
described context has a feedback effect on the parties, making their decision-making more 
centralised, oligarchic, and located practically in the hands of the president of the party. 
                                                 
23 In a recent Interview, the former Vice-President of the Serbian Government, Miroljub Labus, said that 
“the tycoons cooperate perfectly with all parties – from the Radicals to the Democratic Party of Serbia; 
they have become part of the system”, daily Danas, 11-12 November 2006.  STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 7 
The mechanisms used 
The following analysis will concentrate on ’state capture’ as a specific process in which political 
elites gain control of public offices, enterprises, utilities, and resources through a mingling of 
state, political party, and economic power. Emphasis is placed on the concrete mechanisms 
which explain how political parties impose their own benefits over public interests, how these 
mechanisms are incorporated into the multy-party system and how the party-state amalgamation 
has been achieved. 
I have selected the following six interconnected mechanisms of state capture: 
1)  Division of the government and the entire public sector into a feudal-type system whereby 
each party in the ruling coalition is given control over the portion it receives (based roughly 
on the number of MPs it has in parliament) as if it were its own private fief
24 “Vertical 
Partition” of the Government, as it is called in public, has eliminated the mutual political 
control of the coalition partners. 
2)  Connected with the first, the second mechanism entails appointing leading party officials 
(presidents, their deputies, etc) to manage the ’fiefs’ although they are simultaneously 
discharging their party offices. Because the party leader-feudalist has MPs in the parliament 
providing majority support to the government, corruption is practically incorporated into the 
manner in which the government operates.
25 If a minister were to be dismissed for 
corruption, he would withdraw his MPs and the Government would lose the parliamentary 
majority and fall.  
3)  Degradation of the parliament and the mechanism used for bribing MPs assuring their 
loyalty: obedience is obtained by offering the MPs multiple functions such as being 
appointed to the managing boards of the public companies or being appointed to perform 
executive functions in local and regional governments, enabling them to receive several 
sources of income.  
4)  Parties in the ruling coalition have the exclusive ’right’ to make appointments in state 
administration, public companies, utilities, institutes, agencies, funds, health, social and 
cultural centres, dormitories, veterinary clinics, schools, theatres, hospitals, libraries, 
monuments and memorial parks’ maintenance services – all of which belong to the public 
and are supported by the public budget. Management positions are not advertised and based 
                                                 
24 Given the current constellation of political forces and the proportional election system, no party can 
win a majority. Therefore, coalitions are formed at all levels of authority. At the local government level, 
coalitions are broader and their clashes over the division of power are the cause of constant 
decompositions of the local governments.  
25 For instance, the Capital Investments Minister publicly admitted that the public company Serbia 
Railways, which is under the control of his party (the director of the company is from his party), had not 
respected the procurement procedure when buying Swedish railway cars. Despite the confession, nobody 
suffered any consequences because if the Minister and the Director of the public company were to have 
been made responsible and subject to legal proceedings, it could have prompted the withdrawal of support 
to the government of his MPs’ and the government would have fallen. In fact, the person who disclosed 
the irregularities was dismissed from his post. The Finance Minister found himself to be in a similar 
situation when the case of the National Saving Banks was once again opened to the public. This case 
connects the Minister with the corruption that was discovered. The accusations against the Minister were 
disclosed on a TV show by the President of the Anti-corruption Council of the Government of Serbia, 
Verica Barac, but to no avail because the same mechanism of protection was applied.  8 | VESNA PESIC 
on merit, which additionally damages public interests and constitutes widespread 
discrimination of citizens on the basis of party affiliations. 
26 
5)  The relationship between parties (government) and business is not regulated in a transparent 
manner because the Law on the Funding of Political Parties, passed in 2003, is deficient in 
its controlling mechanisms and was not strictly and effectively implemented in practice. The 
effectiveness of this law is the same as that of other similar laws for which “political will” is 
needed. There is a tacit agreement between the parties not to implement the law strictly.
27 
As a result, corruption in this area has not diminished. The parties have remained the centre 
of the corruption.  
6)  Political influence over the judicial system is excessive, and there is a lack of checks and 
balances between the three main state powers. The executive branch (which again means 
party influence) has gained control over the parliament, the courts and public prosecution. 
This key mechanism is an extremely extensive separate topic which must be investigated in-
depth independently, and it will therefore not be part of this research.  
3.  How the government functions as a confederation of party ‘fiefs’ 
I will analyse the party feudal system at the national level by presenting details about the cases 
of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Sport. I will then describe how the 
‘party state’ functions at the local level by presenting the case of Novi Sad, which is the third 
largest city in Serbia and the capital of Vojvodina province.  
 
Box 1. The political system, appointments and influence 
Serbia has adopted a parliamentary political system. The party (or the coalition of parties) which gets a 
majority of MPs in parliament (250 seats) elects the government as an executive state-organ. The 
Government now has 19 ministries, but the number is changeable (each government decides the 
number of ministries). It has the President of the Government (Prime Minister). The number of MPs of 
a particular party that are elected, if the party is a member of the government ruling coalition, defines 
the proportion the party will receive of the ministries and all other positions in the public enterprises 
(there are 17 public companies founded by the Government), institutions, agencies, foundations and 
services which are under the jurisdiction of the government. Many positions are under the jurisdiction 
of each minister. Since Serbia is a highly-centralised country, one minister, for example, the Minister 
of Education and Sport, has the authority to appoint more than 3,000 directors of primary schools, and 
about 400 directors of secondary schools in Serbia
28 (schools in Vojvodina are not under the Serbian 
Ministry). The Minister of Health has similar appointment authority, appointing directors for the 
hospitals, health centres, and other health institutions founded by the government, etc.  
                                                 
26 The implementation of the new Law on State Administration took effect in July 2006. Along with the 
many problems involved in its application and the usual deficiencies of the law itself, it has been reported 
that many advertisements began to appear in the newspapers for the positions of deputy-ministers. See 
Ana Trbovic, Blic (daily newspaper), 25 November 2006. 
27 Only three parties (there are about 39 active parties and a total of more than 400 registered parties) 
submitted their complete annual financial and activity report on time to the Financial Board of the 
Assembly. This shows that the parties do not respect their obligations established by law. For greater 
detail about this problem see: Vladimir Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju 
(Struggles among Parties in Serbia in Post-October Period), Fridrich Ebert Shiftung, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 
179-204. 
28 The source for determining the number of schools in Central Serbia: Statistical Year Book of 
Yugoslavia, 2000. Bozidar Djelic also reported that there are 3960 primary schools and 577 secondary 
schools (the total for Serbia), Kada cemo ziveti bolje, Belgrade, 2006. STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 9 
In addition to the appointments at the national level, there are a huge number of appointments in the 
public sector at the local level (governments, public companies, services and institutions which are 
under the jurisdiction of the autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and partly Kosovo), cities, and 
municipalities. Appointments in the provinces, cities and municipalities (there are about 160 
municipalities) belong to the parties’ coalitions at that level. Proportions vary from one city or 
municipality to another. It is estimated that the magnitude of power in the hands of the 
government/parties amounts to 40,000 appointments counting all levels – national, provincial, city and 
municipality. 
 
3.1  The feudal/party system at the national level: The cases of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Sport  
At present, the ruling coalition in Serbia is composed of four parties,
29 which distribute the 
’fiefs’ as follows: 
Party  Number of MPs  Number of ministries  Quotas in public companies 
(managing positions) 
DPS 53  10  (11)  50% 
G17+ 34  4  (3)  30% 
SRM-NS 22  5  20% 
SPS 20  -  Quota  of  DPS 
 
The coalition agreement sets the percentages of public offices that each ruling party receives in 
accordance with the number of seats won in the Parliament. The second part of the agreement 
has had a direct impact on the growth of corruption during the last three years. This aspect was 
not present in the first post- Milosevic government.
30 It focuses on the content and classifies all 
offices by portfolios (horizontally and vertically). State capture and monopoly constitute part of 
the division – each coalition party receives a number of related portfolios and staff to manage by 
itself. Power is thus feudalised – each ruling party is the absolute ruler of its own ’fief’. The 
government is now operating as a confederation of ’power fiefs’. This ‘holistic’ division of 
power among the ruling parties has produced unaccountable government; individual ministers 
have become more powerful and with broader authority and functions; government does not 
function as a team, and the Prime Minister does not take responsibility for the government as a 
whole or each ministry, as was the case in the first government.  
                                                 
29 The DPS (Democratic Party of Serbia) president is Vojislav Kostunica who is also Prime Minister of 
Serbia; G17 Plus President Mladjan Dinkic is Minister of Finance; SRM (Serbian Renewal Movement of 
Vuk Draskovic President of the Party is Minister of Foreign Affairs, and NS (New Serbia), President 
Velimir Ilic is Minister of Capital Investments. The government thus composed still did not have a 
majority in the Parliament, and as a minority government, it is supported by the SPS (Socialist Party of 
Serbia of Slobodan Milosevic, presently led by Ivica Dacic).  
30 The first post-Miloševic government was formed by 18 parties, but it avoided the 'feudal' division of 
portfolios. The first government (2001-03) had two parts: one composed of experts and non-party 
personalities who got their positions on merit and, the second part was political and composed of 
numerous political leaders of the parties who participated in the grand coalition against the Milosevic 
regime and who got the positions of vice prime minister. The composition of each ministry was a mixture 
of different parties, so effective control was achieved even without strong and strict institutional rules of 
control.  10 | VESNA PESIC 
How the ‘feudal system’ functions in practice  
The strongest party (the DPS) with 53 MPs controls 10 ministries (plus the Ministry of Defence 
after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro). This party exclusively controls appointments in 
the two most powerful ‘institutions of authority’: Internal Affairs (the Ministry of Police and the 
Intelligence Agency) and Economic Affairs (two ministries: one for the internal economy and 
the other for International Economic Relations). In the same manner, this party holds the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Science, the Ministry of Education and Sport, the Ministry 
of State Administration and Local Self-Management, the Ministry for Religion and the Ministry 
of Energy. As the strongest party, the DPS manages the largest (mainly monopoly) companies, 
like Telecom (and the telecommunications system), PTT (Post Office, Telegraph and Telephone 
Company), ‘Galenika’ (the biggest pharmaceutical company whose director is vice-president of 
the DPS), Yugo-Import (an arms-trading company), etc.  
G17 Plus exclusively controls the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Serbia, and all 
financial institutions, as well as money circulation. It also controls the Ministries of Health and 
Agriculture. Both ministries have a huge vertical control of local appointments all over Serbia, 
including the big monopoly company Srbija Sume (Serbian Forests) which is often described as 
a “state within a state“. The SRM-NS coalition
31 has been allocated the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and Capital Investments, as their most important ‘fiefs’. They have three more 
ministries: the Ministry for Diaspora, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Commerce & 
Tourism. The NS (New Serbia) controls the Railways of Serbia and the Roads of Serbia, while 
the SRM controls Belgrade Fair (at the beginning this party controlled Yugoslav Airway 
Transportation -– JAT, but for mismanagement, the position of the president of the Executive 
Board was given to the vice-president of DPS).  
The ‘confederation of fiefs’ of the interior, economy and finance (where the power lies) is in 
fact an exchange-system of services and interests between the parties in the coalition (and their 
hidden financiers) based on mutual blackmailing to withdraw MPs from the Parliament if a 
minister (i.e. president of the party) were to be denounced for corruption. This system corrupts 
key state institutions: the police, intelligence,
32 the judiciary, finance and economic institutions, 
health care and the national budget expenditure. The system also combines different ministries 
in the hands of one party in order to multiply their power. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture received new authority to deliver credits directly to the farmers, without a 
transparent procedure; on the other hand, it got from the Minister of Finance (at the time Vice-
President of the G17 Plus) a tenfold bigger budget than this Ministry had before. In this way it 
gained huge discretional authority, which was denounced in public, to be used for buying 
political support and votes.
33 In conclusion, it is not an exaggeration to say that the ‘feudalised 
government’ is integrated by its own corruption.  
The case of the Ministry of Finance 
To demonstrate the very peculiar structure of the Government of Serbia, which I have described 
as a confederation of ’power fiefs’, I will analyse the Ministry of Finance and public financial 
                                                 
31 This coalition does not exist any more. After the ruling coalition was formed, some parties and 
coalitions split. Details about the consequences of these new divisions on the pubic sector are not 
provided.  
32 The Intelligence Service was used last year to spy on the MPs about their intentions to vote for the 
budget of 2006. Two people were expelled from the Parliament overnight because they said that they 
would not vote for the budget.  
33 The non-transparent approval of credits to the farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture, was denounced 
most often in public by the Radicals, since farmers are their main constituency.  STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 11 
institutions. G17 Plus has been allocated all portfolios regarding finance. Its leader is the 
Finance Minister (he is the active President of the G17 Plus) and he has appointed “reliable” 
associates and party cronies to the posts below him. The same party has been given rule over 
central financial institutions and services. Primary among them is the National Bank of Serbia, 
although it should have independent status. The party also controls other independent 
institutions such as the Commercial Bank, the Securities Commission, State Statistics et al., and 
the executive departments under the Ministry such as the Tax Administration, the Customs 
Administration, the Lottery, etc. About 90% of all positions are appointed by party criteria and 
are members of the G17 Plus.
34 (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2. Tree of the G17 Plus’ fief 
 
 
                                                 
34 Data about both ministries and their party appointments have been obtained with the help of journalists 
and insiders who are previous and present holders of high senior positions in the Ministries.  
Statistics 
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The striking fact is that institutions like the tax and customs administrations, the National Bank 
of Serbia,
35 the Securities Commission, the State Statistics, and other institutions that have to be 
independent from political influence are interwoven with party functions.
36 The lack of 
transparency in the recruitment process for government and state institutions’ positions, and in 
the way in which party/state functions are fused at the central level, has severely damaged the 
accountability of government.  
Apart from the horizontal (at the national level) party rule, this party also rules vertically by 
appointing the heads of local tax administrations, customs boards and other local administration 
units. Procedures for local appointments include proposals from the local party units. In 
practice, employment opportunities for the heads of local tax administrations, customs, etc. are 
not publicly advertised or discussed officially; local party boards recruit the heads of the local 
administration units all over Serbia.
37 The selected candidates are sent to the Minister for 
approval. About 90% of the director appointments at the local level for tax or customs offices 
are from the ranks of the G17 Plus. In practice, horizontally and vertically, all the financial 
branches and the money circulation are under the control of one party without internal or 
external control, nor competition for the appointments. Two hierarchies – the party and the state 
– have overlap. That is how the closed, ’fief’ system of authority functions.  
The case of the Ministry of Education and Sport (MES) 
The next analysis shows the comparison between the first and second post-Milosevic 
governments related to the party membership of the Ministry itself, appointed Heads of the 
County Educational Departments and the appointments in institutions, companies and 
commissions dealing with education in Serbia. It reveals the degree to which professionalisation 
has been replaced by the party system in this Ministry. 
Party membership of the ministry in the first and second governments 
Positions  I Government  II Government 
Minister CAS  DPS 
Vice-Minister DP  DPS 
Deputy Minister  Non- party  DPS 
Deputy Minister  Non- party  DPS 
Deputy Minister  Non- party  DPS coalition party 
Deputy Minister  CAS  Unknown 
                                                 
35 Since October 2000, Serbia has changed three governors of the National Bank. The first Governor was 
Mr. Dinkic, at present Minister of Finance; the second was a non-party expert appointed to replace Mr. 
Dinkic because he, as a vice-president of the G17, was involved in partisan politics; the third governor of 
the NBS was a candidate from the ranks of the G17 Plus, when this party became the member of the 
ruling coalition.  
36 For example, the Director of the Tax Administration of Serbia was a member of G17 Plus; advancing 
politically, he became a member of the G17 Plus Executive Board; recently he was transferred to the 
position of State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, while his position in the Tax Administration was 
given to another member of the same party.  
37 Ex-Minister of Finance, Bozidar Djelic, in his recently-published book said that he was under pressure 
from the local party boards of the DOS coalition who ‘suggested’ to him who the heads in the Tax 
Administration should be. He complains that he became very unpopular among DOS local activists 
because he refused to let them impose personnel in Tax Administration. However, he estimates that 
during the last two years, the situation has changed in the opposite direction; some people without 
professional references have received positions in the Tax Administration, while some with established 
professional reputations have lost their positions at the request of the local party boards, or because there 
were doubts about their ‘party loyalty’.  STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 13 
Composition of the heads of county educational departments, by party affiliation 
Counties  2000/Minister/CAS
38 
Heads 
2004/Minster/DPS 
Heads 
Sombor Non-party  DPS 
Zrenjanin -||-  DPS 
Novi Sad  -||-  DPS 
Pozarevac CAS  DPS 
Valjevo DP  DPS 
Kragujevac Non-party  DPS 
Nis CAS  DPS 
Zajecar DC  DPS 
Leskovac Non-party  DPS 
Beograd CAS  DPS 
Kosovo-Ranilug Previous  DPS 
Kosovka Mitrovica  -||-  Previous 
Cacak -  DPS 
Krusevac -  DPS 
 
When the new government came into power, the Heads of County Educational Departments 
appointed in 2000 were all dismissed (except one in Kosovo); the turnover at this middle-rank 
position was one hundred per cent. All new appointments were exclusively selected from the 
dominant party for this party fief (the Minister’s Party is the Democratic Party of Serbia – DPS). 
Since their professional reputations were much lower, this turnover meant that more-qualified 
people were replaced with less-professional directors. This change reflected the changes in the 
Ministry itself: the best experts available in Serbia were hired as leaders of the educational 
reform in the first government, but they were all thrown out to give place to the ‘reliable’ people 
of the new dominant party.  
The same type of one-party control criteria can be found in all other educational institutions: 
The Centres as well as the semi-independent institutions (founded by the Ministry) devoted to 
development and evaluation of the quality of education, professional training of teachers, etc.) 
were reorganised. The directors of the Centres (experts and non-party people) were dismissed 
and replaced with less qualified people from the DPS.
39 Public companies founded by the 
Ministry such as the very profitable Text Book Publishing Company, were given to the DPS.  
The same party (DPS) got the position of President of the Board for Education in the 
Parliament. On the lower side of the hierarchy, going down to the directors of the schools, the 
official procedure theoretically empowers the schools boards composed of nine people (three 
parents, three school employees, and three from the local government) to elect the director and 
send the elected candidate to be approved by the Minister. But in practice it is not so, because 
the three people from the local government who are from the party, impose the selection of the 
school director in many cases.
40 The forging of party criteria for appointing directors of the 
primary and secondary schools all over Serbia, has led to numerous public conflicts between the 
                                                 
38 Two parties in the first government – The Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS) and the Democratic Center 
(DC) – are small liberal parties with many professionals and experts. Both joined the big coalition against 
Milosevic. 
39 One MP in the Parliament said that we can “speak about the terror of government and politics over 
professionalism and qualifications in the state administration”.  
40 One candidate for School Director in the city of Nis was threatened with death if she did not withdraw 
her candidacy. She was a victim of political revenge, as was the case all over Serbia. It was said that 
political pressures are present in all institutions and procedures.  14 | VESNA PESIC 
Minister and schools which did not want to accept the imposed and unqualified directors. Only 
when the schools threatened to go on strike because of the political appointments imposed by 
the Ministry, were they able to win the battle for more qualified and professional directors of the 
schools.
41 
The analysed pattern of ‘party recruitments’ is not specific only to the Ministry of Education or 
to the Ministry of Finance. Upon investigating the individual appointments of directors at the 
local level, in schools, libraries, cultural centres etc., and noting the number that were appointed 
by the central government, it is evident that non-party candidates have had almost no chance to 
reach a director position in local-level institutions
42. The analysis of some individual cases has 
shown that at the very moment when one party ‘conquers’ a ministry, the local party 
functionaries start insisting to party headquarters that they get the leading position against other 
candidates in the competition. The party administration prepares the case for the Presidency of 
the Party to influence their ministers to appoint ‘our people’.  
The here described widespread practice giving almost absolute advantage to a ‘party candidate’ 
has marginalised both fair competition and professionalism in the managing positions. By 
preventing competition and weakening professionalism, corruption has become protected within 
the political/party hierarchy and has been influenced by the top positions in government. This is 
a general rule that is being applied in all ministries and middle administration positions in the 
county institutions and companies – down to the local level offices.
43  
Public companies
44 
Privatisation in Serbia is only half-complete. In total, about 50% of the companies are still 
owned by the state, or have mixed state, ‘social’ and private property. When taken together, 
40% of the total workforce lives in the unreformed economy.  
The most important aspect of state capture is the ‘seizure’ of the public companies. Parties in 
the ruling coalition manage them exclusively. Public property has thereby effectively been 
converted into ‘party property’ and is managed in its interests. And it is a huge amount of assets 
that has been captured. The 17 biggest companies founded by the government of Serbia are 
managed by the parties that comprise the ruling coalition at the national level – the managing 
boards, presidents and directors – are compiled and by a quota-system are divided up among 
each of the parties of the ruling coalition which appoint the management positions as if the 
                                                 
41 The most striking case, when the school choice for the Director won, was in the Economic (secondary) 
School in Cacak.  
42 The case refers to the selection of the heads of libraries which the Republic of Serbia has founded and 
whose appointments are given to the Ministry of Culture. The heads of the libraries in the cities of Nis 
and Jagodina have been appointed according to the party criteria of the Minister. This caused 
considerable public outcry. Candidates with more qualifications for the job threatened that they would 
appeal to the International Labor Organisation for protection under the equal access to jobs and functions 
requirement. Via personal contact I learned that in many cases ministers are informed by the local party 
boards as to who the favourite in the competition should be.  
43 The Police Minister has replaced all 16 Heads of Police Districts, and in total, he replaced about 700 
senior policemen since he took over the office. There is no audit or supervision of budget spending in the 
police, nor civilian control of the police and intelligence. Police procurements are a ‘state secret’ exempt 
from monitoring.  
44 “Public companies” in Serbia are companies which manage ‘public utilities’ in different sectors such as 
energy, transportation, telecommunications and natural resources. They are very big and often are 
monopolies. Their management boards are appointed by the Government of Serbia. In each municipality 
or city there are public utilities whose management is appointed by the local governments.  
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companies were their own property. All other public companies – about 500 – are in the hands 
of the ruling coalitions at the local levels (see Box 2 below).  
There are many indicators that management-hiring decisions in the public companies do not 
follow the criteria of merit, experience and qualifications. Nor are managers held responsible for 
results. If the government wants to keep low prices, producing losses, the managers appointed 
by the parties must comply. This is the case with electricity prices that are lower than in the rest 
of the region. Justification for controlling prices in electricity (or other prices) is the socially- 
based argument of subsidising the low salaries of the population; it also serves to present 
inflation as being nominally lower. But the low prices have also provided substantial benefits to 
the private interests of the party-related firms that are selling electricity abroad. Such 
discretional decisions about prices in public companies can bring enormous profit to the tycoons 
who are financing the parties of the ruling coalition.  
Box 2. State ownership of public companies 
State ownership of public companies is still extremely large and privatisation is still in its early stages, 
due to the resistance of the political parties to lose their power over such extensive resources. 
According to NBS (National Bank of Serbia) data for 2004 (data for 2005 have not yet been released), 
financial reports were submitted by 521 public companies employing 190,000 workers (i.e. 16% of 
Serbia’s workforce). The value of their capital stood at 932 billion dinars and their collective loses at 
21 billion dinars. 
The 17 public companies owned by the Republic of Serbia had a gross income of 713.21 billion dinars, 
which is 18.7% of the total income of the Serbian economy. The net profit of profitable companies was 
32.59 billion dinars which was double the amount earned in 2004. total losses of companies that lost 
money were 33.24 billion dinars, which accounts for 15.8% of the total losses of the Serbian economy. 
These figures should not obscure the fact that 45.8% of the total capital and 43.5% of the permanent 
resources of the Serbian economy are concentrated in the 17 public companies. If this capital produces 
only 18.7% of the total revenue of the economy, then the conclusion can not be positive about the 
productivity of the public companies. These companies employ 11.4% of the total workforce. Their 
salaries tend to be higher than average because they account for 16.7% of the gross wage expenditure 
for of all people employed in Serbia. This difference in salary is found almost totally in the top 
management levels. 
Source: Data about public companies are taken from articles published in July 2006 issues of the Belgrade 
daily Danas. 
 
Since public companies are the political-power stronghold of the ruling parties, they are used in 
many different ways. Benefits for the party include the companies being used for the 
employment of party members and for rewarding party functionaries for their loyalty with the 
extra income of directorships. Parties may also get free direct services such as publicity for their 
campaigns, the publishing of journals and advertising materials, the delivering of presents to the 
socially deprived in the name of the party, etc. They even serve to control media: the biggest 
public company, Electro-distribution of Serbia, has purchased 14% of the shares of the daily 
newspaper Politika, using public money to retain government control over the news media.
45 
The government has direct control over the public company Radio-TV of Serbia (RTS), even 
                                                 
45  Politika is the oldest and the most influential of Serbian newspapers. Traditionally it has been 
controlled by the government. At present, half of it is owned by the German company Vac and half by 
small domestic shareholders. In order to help the papers pay its debt (€6 million) and to retain control of 
50% of shareholder equity, the Electric Company Electro-Distribution invested the money and became a 
14% owner of Politika. 16 | VESNA PESIC 
though it was supposed to be an independent information public service.
46 In a somewhat 
different way, the government controls Vecernje Novosti, the most popular daily, by preventing 
an independent person from buying a majority stake. On the contrary, it was sold to tycoons 
close to the government and its ruling parties. On the local level, the ruling parties control the 
public media. The most recent drastic case was to dismiss the editorial board of the weekly 
papers in Zrenjanin. This was done by Kostunica’s DPS, which had taken control of the 
municipality.
47  
The ‘right’ to appoint directors, as well as managing boards, is not subject to any public control 
regarding the use of resources or salaries for the management board. Nor is there any 
independent external auditing of the real situation in the company. When asked about the 
salaries of the top management, the directors of the public companies chose not to answer, 
saying that it is a ‘secret’.
48 Detailed research on salaries in public companies shows that the 
average income of the employees is not significantly higher than in other enterprises. Income is 
much higher only for the top-management boards who, in individual cases, receive more than 
500.000 dinars per month (6 thousands euros, in a country where the average salary is €200-
250). Salaries for the members of the managing boards vary from company to company but they 
can be two or three times the average managerial salary. The true benefit is even much greater 
because it is not a job, but a position that can be held in addition to regular jobs or other 
positions.  
Party-nominated management boards are not there to control and supervise the business results 
of the company and work for the public interest, but to ‘turn a blind eye’ to their own and party 
interests. Public companies are the nest of corruption and the loss of public money. This can be 
changed only by the process of privatisation. The IMF suggests that real reforms will start when 
public companies, (most often monopolies) enter an adequately-designed and controlled 
privatisation process.
49 Only then will the real reforms in Serbia take place.  
3.2  Local level: the case of Novi Sad 
The city of Novi Sad was selected as a case study to demonstrate the link between party gains 
and the turnover of executive employment in municipalities and their public companies, utilities 
and services. This city is a clear case of the party shift after local elections because the Serbian 
Radical Party (SPR) won the last elections in 2004 (with two coalition partners: the Socialist 
Party of Serbia and the DPS) after the Democratic Party (DP) with its coalition partners had 
                                                 
46 The first thing that Kostunica’s Government did was to illegally appoint the new director of the State 
TV. Citizens are required by law to pay for this TV service together with their electricity bill, although 
the RTS is not really an independent public service, since it is controlled by the government and the 
ruling parties.  
47 Justification for the dismissal was that an editorial written about Ratko Mladic was not a ‘local topic’. It 
should be mentioned that the newspapers were very successful financially and were widely read by the 
people of Zrenjanin. 
48 Although the Commissar for the Free Access to Information reacted, and requested that the companies 
respond as required by law, there has been no answer.  
49 Under pressure from the IMF, the Serbian Government hired a foreign privatisation advisor to assist 
privatisation of Naftna industrija Srbija (NIS) – the Serbian Petrol Industry – which is one of the largest 
public companies of Serbia. Despite paying for strategy advice on privatisation procedures, the 
government secretly held negotiations with the Russian company (‘Rosnjeft’) in order to avoid a publicly 
announced tender. The secret negotiations were held during the last two months of 2006 although the 
privatisation was planned to start at the beginning of 2007. Daily newspapers Danas, 6-7 January 2007.  STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 17 
dominated the city for 8 years. The Radicals got 35 elected members of the City Assembly, and 
with their partners, had a majority of 42 representatives (out of 78 assembly members).  
As has been demonstrated at the national level, state capture of all positions in public offices is 
the model operating at the local level as well. On the local level it is more visible how elected 
people get jobs in public companies, and how nepotism operates together with cronyism.  
The structure of the City Authority 
The table below shows the government structure by the party-related distribution of the 
‘ministries’ and positions in the local government. It shows that there was a 100% turnover after 
the local elections: one party (coalition) enters the local government and takes over all public 
positions; after the next election, another army comes along to take over their positions. It also 
demonstrates that no professionalism is needed.  
Government/Secretariats  City Council 2004 -
present  City Council 2000-2004 
Mayor (directly elected)   SRP   LSV* 
City Architect/Urbanism  Quota of SRP  LSV 
City manager  SRP  - 
Budget and finances  SRP  DP 
Communal activities  SRP  DP 
Transportation   SRP  LSV 
Social protection  SRP  CAS 
Sport SRP  DP 
Environment SRP  - 
Culture SRP  LSV 
Education SPS  Reform  Party/Vojvodina 
Economy SPS  RP/Vojvodina 
Administration and legal affairs   SPS  DP 
Health DPS  CAS 
Information  -  Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
* The League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina. 
The table above shows the government structure by the party-related distribution of the 
‘ministries’ and positions in the local government. It shows that there was a 100% turnover after 
the local elections: one party (coalition) enters the local government and takes over all public 
positions; after the next election, another army comes along to take over their positions. It also 
demonstrates that no professionalism is needed.  
The cost in terms of managerial capacity is enormous. As soon as one group of managers gains 
the knowledge and experience to lead health or education etc. it may be thrown out and replaced 
after the next elections. Hundreds of people who were appointed by the Democratic Party before 
the last elections had to find another job
50, and it will be the same with Radicals when they lose 
the elections and a new coalition comes into power in Novi Sad. Investments in the training of 
                                                 
50 No exact number is available as to how many appointed positions (jobs) there are in the city of Novi 
Sad. There are only different estimations, which vary from 500 to 1000 positions.  18 | VESNA PESIC 
local government cadres are a complete waste, without establishing professionalism criteria in 
the local institutions. Since local government and services are closest to the needs of the 
citizens, the practice of totally politicising local functions is damaging to public interests, as if 
local governments exist only to employ party cronies, families and friends.  
The ‘turnover’ of power is used in several different ways to the benefit of the party cronies, 
families and friends and against the citizens’ and the public interest:  
1)  To obtain leading positions in the public companies: of the 42 members of the Assembly 
who were elected, 24 got jobs in public companies in the positions of directors and 
professional posts. Three members of the City Assembly elected from the DP list left their 
party and joined the Radicals majority for family reasons (to protect their husbands from 
losing director positions which they occupied in the previous distribution of managing 
positions in the public companies). 
2)  More than 1,000 people received jobs without public advertisement and competition in the 
city administration and public companies. During the first 13 months of the rule of the 
Radicals, 965 people from their party were employed in the public companies and utilities 
(while the DP employed 654 people during the 8 years of their rule). Many of the 
employments were based on nepotism (family and friendship ties), creating numerous 
public scandals. The mayor of Novi Sad reacted to nepotism scandals by delivering a 
special announcement “that she is against nepotism and conflict of interests, calling 
appointees to show public awareness and give up positions obtained in such an immoral 
way”. But nothing has changed. All the ‘immoral positions’ have remained in the hands of 
family members, party cronies and friends. 
3)  More than 30 people without the required educational qualifications, via family and party 
ties, got jobs in the city administration, in leading positions. The jobs were in the public 
companies and utilities (there are 15 such companies under the rule of the city and they are 
in the hands of the ruling coalition) and in institutions of culture, urbanism, museums, 
school boards and directors and etc.  
4)  The Radicals and their coalition partners (DPS and SPS), who divided the public 
companies, have ignored the previous practice that the presidents of the managing boards of 
the public companies (and institutions) and the presidents of the monitoring boards must be 
from different parties. This practice had enabled some elementary internal control to be 
established. Now both the president of the managing boards and the presidents of the 
monitoring bodies are from the same party. 
5)  The dramatic lowering of the qualifications of the appointees in the local government and 
companies has led to huge losses which must be covered by the city budget (which is 
created from the money of the citizen tax payers). The financial reports of the city 
companies have shown that they have been making less and less profit; the city 
transportation company has had a five-fold bigger loss (deficit) than it had in 2004 (when 
the Radicals came to power) while the biggest company (Sport Center of Novi Sad – 
SPENS) has suffered losses for the first time in its history. The City Assembly passed a 
revision of the budget by which an additional 750 million dinars in subsidies was approved 
for the city companies. This means that more than half of the city budget is being used to 
subsidise public companies. 
6)  The salaries of the directors in the public companies have been raised to such an extent, that 
44 of the directors of the public companies and institutions (as well as their advisors and 
deputies), were on the list of millionaires of Novi Sad. For example: the Director of the 
Public Transport Company (which has had the biggest deficit) has the biggest salary; second 
on this list is the Director of the Institute for Building Novi Sad; third is the Director of the STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 19 
Business Premises Areas, and so on. All directors with the highest salaries are high 
functionaries of the SRP and some of them are also members of the National Parliament.  
In conclusion, data for the City of Novi has demonstrated that the ‘state capture’ and its feudal 
mechanisms installed by the ruling parties has operated on a local level in an even more overt 
and arrogant way; it has severely corrupted the public sector at the expense of the citizens and 
their public interest. 
4.  Degradation of the Serbian parliament and multiple functions of 
MPs
51 
Serbia has a proportional election system: the whole country is one electoral unit, and each 
competing party offers its list of candidates for the 250 seats in the Parliament. This electoral 
system usually produces coalition governments because no single party can gain a majority. The 
parties’ top leaderships (mainly the president of the party) have been able to take control over 
the seats in the Parliament first by composing the candidates’ lists and then by deciding which 
candidates will enter the Parliament after the elections, regardless of their order on the list. The 
arbitrary selection of who will enter the parliament is a relevant corruptive mechanism of state 
capture permitted by the electoral law. Moreover, those who are selected to enter the Parliament 
are obliged to sign blank resignations prior to entering the Parliament. This has become an 
illegal ‘invention’ of the parties. These blank resignations are kept by the party leaders, who 
activate them as needed. If an MP is disloyal or does not vote as instructed (this is especially so 
for the MPs of the ruling parties), s/he is stripped of his or her mandate and thrown out of the 
Parliament. This illegal practice was introduced by Kostunica’s minority government.
52 It was 
illegal because (on 27 May 2003) the Constitutional Court (responding to the complaint of 
Kostunica’s Democratic party of Serbia which was stripped of its mandates) decided that the 
mandate belongs to the individual MP, thus establishing the principle of the ‘independent 
mandate’. This decision limited the power of the party, but it opened up the opportunity for the 
misuse of the mandates, such as ‘selling the mandates’. Mandates were bought, when needed, 
either to keep the majority of the Government, or by the opposition to try to overthrow 
government. Not all cases of “disobedience” fell into this category
53, but the illegal expulsion of 
the MPs became the ‘method’ used by the Government to assure its majority and the 
composition of the Parliament. The ‘method’ was implemented through the Administrative 
Board of the Parliament which is composed of the ruling parties’ representatives.
54  
In trying to eliminate the corruptive mechanisms in the Serbian Parliament, the Venetian 
Commission on Serbian Electoral Legislation has suggested that the electoral legislation in 
Serbia has to be changed to make clear that a) mandates belong to the individual MPs, and b) 
parties and coalitions must announce in advance the numerical order of the candidates who will 
                                                 
51 I will not present in this paper the multiple functions of the Government officials; they can be seen in 
the Policy Documentation Center where I posted my published article on that topic (http://pdc.hu). 
52 Vladimir Goati, Politicke borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju, op. cit., pp. 108-109. Goati has 
shown the changing practice of parties’ control over the mandates in the Serbian Parliament during the 15 
years of the multy-party system.  
53 Two MPs of the G17 Plus said that they would not vote for the 2006 state budget just before the vote 
was taken for the budget in the Parliament. They were excluded from the Parliament the very next day, by 
illegal activation of their ‘blank resignations’.  
54 See more about the misdoings of the Administrative Board, and the illegal use of the ‘blank 
resignations’ in Goati, op. cit., pp. 109-110. In regard to the government’s method to create its majority, 
Goati concluded that it “mutated from government de jure into government de facto, which has 
maintained its position via usurpation”.  20 | VESNA PESIC 
enter the parliament from the lists, instead of being allowed to choose after the elections which 
candidates will get the mandates. Under current practice, citizens never know who they are 
voting for. But instead of enacting the suggested reforms of the Electoral Legislation, the new 
Constitution, created by the agreement of the four leaders of the parties, clearly states that the 
mandates belong to the parties. The ratification of the new Constitution made it more difficult to 
eliminate corruptive mechanisms from the Parliament.  
To cement their obedience, MPs are corrupted by being given money for trips they never made 
and for Parliament committee sessions they never attended. But the main bribery mechanism 
lies in the opportunity of the MPs to accumulate offices: MPs can simultaneously be mayors of 
cities (or municipalities), presidents of the regional government,
55 or members of the local 
governments (‘councils’) and be on the managing boards of funds or agencies. They can be 
elected as assembly members on all other local levels (city and province). They can be business 
advisers, city land bureau directors and members of the managing boards, presidents or directors 
of public companies. The only limitation for MPs imposed by the Law on Conflicts of Interest 
(passed in April 2004) is that they may not have a managerial position in more than one public 
company at a time. By the same law, MPs explicitly have the right “to keep their managing 
rights in other business enterprises, if that does not influence their public functioning and their 
impartial and independent performance”. 
Holding multiple functions allows MPs to have several sources of income. Figure 3 shows that 
61% of MPs have other functions, of which 44% have one more function and 17% hold two or 
more functions. Getting the most lucrative functions in a public company is possible only by 
decision of the president of the party. This gives the party presidents great power by allowing 
them to deliver ‘rewards’ to other party functionaries. The richer the public company one gets, 
the more s/he will gain by sitting on the managing board.  
Figure 3. MPs’ multi-functions 
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Figure 4. MPs’ multi-functions by content 
                                                 
55 This is the case of the president of the Vojvodina Government, who is at the same time an MP, a Vice-
President of the Democratic Party and a member of the Fund for Development. 
Total MPs=246STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 21 
28%
24%
9%
39%
Without other functions
Business functions
Executive and representative
functions at local and
regional levels
Mixed functions
 
 
I have identified 23 individual MPs who have 4 public functions; 17 mayors of the cities are 
MPs.
56 When some of the party leaders were interviewed about the reasons for the accumulation 
of functions, the answer was that the mayors of the cities and municipalities, and the directors of 
city-land bureaux and other institutions want to be MPs because of the immunity they enjoy. 
Another reason for function-accumulation in few hands comes from the oligarchic structures in 
the parties: it is easier to control a small number of people than it is a wider group, as in the case 
of dispersed functions. Some MPs hold all representative roles (cities, provinces) below the 
National Parliament. Being liberated from the restrictions of the Law on the Conflict of Interests 
(which is tightly controlled by their parties), and enjoying a widely-defined immunity, the MPs 
can provide ‘state capture’ in a literal sense as the ‘seizure’ of laws to the advantage of 
corporate business via influential political links in the parliament. They have the privilege to be 
‘legally bribed’.  
Regulations on conflict of interests serve to set standards for public office performance, build 
citizen confidence in state institutions, and prevent multiple functions and corruption. In 
essence, these regulations put limits on the accumulation of functions by public officials, which 
always leads to the concentration of power in a society and the degradation of public interest. If 
public officials are acting in many public roles, they cannot comply with the requirements of 
any of the roles, thus damaging public interest. The Law on the Conflict of Interests passed in 
Serbia has not met public expectations, mainly for the following reasons:  
1)  Many public functions were not embraced by this law, including roles most likely to be 
exposed to corruption, such as positions in the courts, prosecution offices, police, customs, 
tax administration, intelligence and security organs, jails, health and social funds and many 
other important functions. 
2)  The law allows for the accumulation of functions. 
3)  The Republican Board for Preventing Conflicts of Interest is not professionalised. It does 
not set criteria for the election of its members (even education requirements do not exist) 
and their competences are not defined (except for the three members elected by the 
Supreme Court). Members of the Board have other jobs in the private and public sectors and 
they make decisions ad hoc (they meet from time to time, the Law does not say how often 
                                                 
56 It was denied in public that a politician, who is directly elected, can have another public office at the 
same time, referring to the widespread practice of city mayors simultaneously holding MP positions. See 
Nemanja Nenadic (Transparentnost – Srbija): “Sprecavanje i razresavanje sukoba javnog i privatnog 
interesa” (“Preventing and Resolving Conflicts between Public and Private Interest”), in Konflit interesa 
kod javnih funkcionera i javnih sluzbenika u Srbiji (Conflict of Interests of Public Functionaries and 
Public officers), Transparentnost – Srbija, 2006, pp. 89-106. 
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the Board will meet and according to what procedure). How they are elected is also 
questionable (the Supreme Court elects three members, the Bar Association one and the 
National Parliament five on the proposal of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art), 
giving SASA a de facto majority on the Board. 
4)  The Law does not contain sanctions for the conflict of interest. The Board can only give 
non-public warnings followed by public recommendations for resignation if the non-public 
warning does not have an effect on violators of the law. The property of the functionaries is 
a secret not available to the public, etc.  
5.  Regulatory institutions, laws and anti-corruption policies in Serbia: 
An overview with special attention given to the law on financing 
political parties 
From the point of the ’state capture’ problem, we will see what Serbia has been doing to create 
independent regulatory institutions, and anti-corruption policies. We will investigate how far it 
has proceeded towards controlling the political governing process and the powerful ‘political 
class’, and towards reforming the economic process so as to reduce and eliminate monopolies 
and the special privileges of the business elite (tycoons) based on political influence.  
If Serbia wants to join the EU integration process, she must build strong anti-corruption 
institutions whose target must be to improve the performance of the public sector in general, 
rather than to reduce corruption per se. She must develop a professional and merit-based civil 
service as an important step in the long-term process of reducing corruption; she must establish 
the supreme independent auditing institution to control budget expenditure and audit how 
taxpayers’ money is spent (this institution should control all public budgets, including the 
Serbian National Bank and the managing of public money, public companies, political parties, 
etc). She must establish a functioning Ombudsperson position and anti-corruption commissions 
and agencies and build a wide network of regulatory institutions and monitoring boards which 
can strengthen the capacity of society to prevent the excessive influence of state organs and 
political voluntarism. Effective legislative improvements are also needed in the fields of a) free 
access to public information, b) the elimination of conflict of interests (which I have previously 
commented on), c) the promotion of free competition, d) the financing of political parties, e) 
regulations of the ‘one-stop shop’ concept, and so on. 
Serbia has started to form the above-mentioned institutions but its policies have not been 
decisive, and the results are more than modest. The supposed regulatory institutions that have 
been formed all have grave deficiencies due to distorted political influence. Due to the almost 
total political management of the so-called ‘independent agencies’, it has even been suggested 
that it is better to overtly return their functions to the government in order to clarify who is 
really responsible. Anti-corruption actions have been arbitrary and abrupt, using selective 
arrests
57 and phoney publicity; they have been ad hoc, being formed and disbanded from one 
                                                 
57 In the interview of one MP, a well-informed person, the following accusation was made during a 
Parliament session urgently called to strip the immunity of the State Prosecutor who was already arrested: 
“This session was called because one businessman ordered the government to arrest all his rivals. This 
businessman gave them a lot of money. This supposed justification for stripping the Prosecutor’s 
immunity was more than ridiculous. The real reason was that he prevented Merkator from buying C 
market. I will leave it to the reader to guess the name of the businessman who was bothered by this 
decision of the Prosecutor. The comment was made during the interview “He gives them (to the ruling 
parties in the government) so much money that he can order them to do what he wants”. Skupstinska 
mreza, October 2006 
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day to the next. An indicative story refers to the formation of the specialised Anti-corruption 
Agency, which Serbia has the obligation to create according to international conventions (the 
UN and the Council of Europe) she signed. The first framework for the specialist Anti-
corruption Agency was created in 2002 (with the cooperation of the OECD and the Council of 
Europe). Drafting of a Law on the Anti-corruption Agency was delayed by the present 
government. Only recently (October 2006), did the public learn that the government has 
prepared a proposal for this Agency. It will not come into effect until at least 1 October 2007. 
Among the responsibilities of this Agency will be the control of the financing of the political 
parties. 
I will now give a brief overview of some of the anti-corruption institutions and laws that exist, 
giving special attention to the Law on the Financing of Political Parties because of its key role 
in curbing state capture and the links between political party leadership and the economic elite 
(tycoons).  
1)  Almost nothing has been done to introduce professional requirements for appointed 
positions. An improvement was made in the state administration, by passing the Law on 
State Administration (it came into effect starting in July, 2006). According to this law, 
deputy ministers will be professionalised and positions will be advertised. But, as always, 
the problem is implementation. Contrary to the declared intentions of the law, the 
government has begun organising an almost total politicisation of staffing from the top to 
the lowest positions of the administration. The staffing initiative started when new elections 
were announced (for 21 January 2007). All of a sudden, in November 2006,
58 a large 
number of advertisements for ‘deputy ministers’ appeared in the newspapers. The intention 
is to transform their party cadres into ‘professional civil servants’ and entrench them in the 
government administration after the elections. Along with this typical ‘political’ 
implementation, the law also has other deficiencies because it does not cover public 
servants in the police, the customs, security, tax administration etc. Experts say that there is 
no ‘political will’ in politicians to give up party influence over state administration. Such a 
change can only happen if Serbia advances towards EU integration and applies the policies 
and procedures that are required for membership. 
2)  In 2005, Serbia passed the Law on the Institution for State Audit, but the Institution has not 
yet been established. Serbia is now the only country in the region that does not have a State 
Audit Institution. In public, the predominant opinion is that there is no readiness on the part 
of the Minister of Finance (and the government) to permit auditing control of any of the 
state institutions, national budget, financial statements of the government and ministries, 
local governments, public enterprises, political parties etc. In Serbia there are no well- 
qualified auditing companies if EU standards are taken as a measure. The best that exist, 
knowing that a state audit would be highly-exposed to political influence and lobbying, do 
not want to risk competing for the job.
59  
3)  The Ombudsperson Law was passed but no one has yet been appointed to that position. In 
Vojvodina an ‘Advocate for the Citizens’ exists, and a similar position was recently created 
                                                 
58 An unusual haste was reported in the press. Crowds lined up in the ministries created by the desire of 
the ruling parties to maintain their political appointees in the government as if they were professionals. In 
great haste, exams for civil servants (professional status) were organised, and passing grades were 
required to retain the positions held. It is reported that some parties are taking revenge against the others 
so that the other parties’ people do not pass the exams. It has also been reported that some people with 
secondary education are passing the exams, while others with PhDs are failing. Blic, daily newspapers, 19 
December 2006. 
59 Ljubisa Stanojevic, professor for accounting and auditing, in Politika, 20 November 2006. 24 | VESNA PESIC 
in the City of Belgrade, but on the national level the situation has remained stagnant from 
the beginning. As is the case with some other important institutions, the Ombudsperson 
became a Constitutional category, so that may help it to function in the future.  
4)  Anti-corruption agencies and commissions have not yet been formed although the National 
Anti-corruption Strategy was passed in the Parliament in December, 2005. What still exists 
is the Anti-corruption Council, a body comprised of civil society representatives, which was 
formed during the first transitional government, and which will be dismissed since the new 
Agency mentioned above will take its place. There are a couple of NGOs that are dealing 
with corruption. The most prominent and active is Transparency Serbia. 
5)  Regulatory institutions are being developed in Serbia but they are not independent from the 
executive or from political, and business influence. Their lack of independence has 
destroyed their reputations from the outset. Each institution has the same problem: they are 
purposely designed by law not to function. The most scandalous case of fixing the work of 
such institutions was Republic Radio-diffusion Agency (RRA) for the ‘neutral’ distribution 
of national frequencies to TV and radio stations. A whole book could be written about the 
scandalous work of the RRA. Other less well-known examples include competition policy 
and the ’Anti-monopoly Commission’.  
Because of the huge domination of monopolies in Serbia (she has received the lowest grade 
– 1 for competition policy),
60 it has been said that Serbia does not have any competition 
policy. Most of the public companies are monopolies; private firms also look for privileges 
in order to avoid market competition (most commonly, protection is purchased by buying 
laws via connections in the government). To curb monopolies, the Law on the Protection of 
Competition was passed last year. The Anti-monopoly Commission was established after a 
long delay. The law will not be effective because of its evident deficiencies: it does not 
punish domination of a market, but only the ‘misuse’ of such a position on the basis of 
“reasonable discretional estimation”. 
6)  The latest draft law on foreign investments included the concept of ‘one-stop shop’ and it is 
another example of the grave distortion of a good idea. The World Bank made very serious 
remarks on how the law will open the door wide to corruption because of its deficiencies. In 
the law, the one-stop shop will be virtual; it will not be an actual office. Each municipality 
(there are almost 160 in all) will be a one-stop shop. The actual shop will simply be the 
discretional judgment of the mayor, and, for larger investment – the Minister of Economy. 
The one-stop shop can be at the service of an investor, or he can be deprived of it, 
depending on the discretional decision of the mayor or the Minister, independently of what 
the law says. Discretional decision-making provides an open invitation to pay-off requests. 
The law on the financing of political parties 
The Law was passed in 2003 but it did not meet the expectations to prevent secret, under-the-
table, party financing, which has become a tradition in Serbia, since the introduction of the multi 
party system in Serbia in 1990. The government and the parties are supported by big capital 
contributions and it is a well-known public ‘secret’ that the tycoons finance all the major parties. 
Individual donations are officially limited for the regular functioning of a political party to 10 
average salaries for persons (per calendar year this amounts to €2,600), and 100 average salaries 
for organisations (amounting to €25,000). For election campaigns, the limit to donations is 
determined in relation to the funds provided from the budget (it is around 350.000 dinars, and 
                                                 
60 According to the Transitional Report of the EBRD for 2005; only two ex-communist countries, 
Turkmenistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina, received such a low grade.  STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 25 
1.4 million dinars for an ongoing campaign). Each contribution must be recorded in the 
accounting books of the party and anonymous donations are forbidden. In practice, however, the 
law is not adhered to and the names of the donors are not disclosed, although by law each 
donation over $100 must be reported along with the name of the donor.  
What is needed is a transparent model for financing the parties and an efficient control-
mechanism. Serbia must pass such a law; there are many good practices that can easily be 
adopted and implemented. But the ‘financing law’ will be useful only if Serbia passes a law on 
political-party organisation, and this is currently lacking. The law presently in effect is the old 
socialist law about ‘social-political organisation’. The need for this law is urgent because there 
are more than 400 parties in Serbia. Any serous control must start by clarifying what constitutes 
a political party and what the procedures for its creation and activities should be.  
The main problem of the existing law is that it does not provide for the establishment of a 
separate institution to monitor the funding of parties, nor a separate body charged with 
supervision. There now exist two control bodies which are not connected with each other: the 
Republic Electoral Commission for the campaigns; and the Parliament Board of Finance for 
controlling regular party activities and financing. This supposed control body is composed of 
party members who submit the financial report. This means that the parties control themselves. 
Although these organs can employ professional reviewers, they abstain from doing it for two 
reasons: first, they lack the political will to really control the party financing; second, these two 
bodies (the REC and PBF) do not have a budget to pay reviewers. Furthermore, these two 
bodies do not have the legal authority to start procedures against a party that violates the law; 
they can only initiate a process that must be carried out by other organs. This practically renders 
inexistent the control of the parties by the law.
61 The law suffers from other deficiencies, such as 
the stipulation that 20% of the money from the budget set aside for party financing should be 
distributed to the parties at the beginning of the campaign, and 80% at the end of the campaign 
(according to success in elections). This means that parties have to find money from other 
sources, because they need money at the beginning of the campaign. Uncertainties in the law, 
and especially its weak control, have paved the way for the undisciplined behaviour of the 
parties. The majority do not respect the law, and do not submit complete financial reports in due 
time. No parties have published their financial reports and made them available to the public, 
although it is required by law. 
Despite the parties having avoided transparent financial operations by taking advantage of the 
weak control mechanisms of the law, they have nevertheless been able to receive between 5 and 
7 million euros a year provided by law from the state budget. There are many indications that 
politicians have systematically been creating loops of companies through which they have 
acquired a lot of that money.
62 Under the same political influence the supposedly independent, 
regulatory institutions (commercial courts, enterprise registries, the stock market and the media) 
have compromised their ability to control corruption. 
                                                 
61 Monitoring of the presidential campaign in 2004 demonstrated that all candidates spent more money 
than permitted, but nothing happened and no sanctions took place. To learn more about the problems of 
the controlling mechanisms set up by law, see the excellent monograph: Vladimir Goati, Nemanja 
Nenadic, Predrag Jovanovic: Finansiranje predsednicke izborne kampanja 2004 u Srbiji (Financing 
Presidential Election Campaign 2004 in Serbia), Transparentnost - Srbija, 2004.  
62 The detailed reports about such cases were submitted to the government by the Anti-Corruption 
Council, but they have never been reviewed.  26 | VESNA PESIC 
The delay of the government to form a specialised Anti-corruption Agency, which would 
effectively control party financing (together with the Institution for State Audit), means that the 
coming elections will be carried out under the existing highly-deficient control mechanisms.
63  
The preceding analysis confirms that Serbian anti-corruption policies are weak, and as such, 
contribute to state capture and corruption. It also confirms that if there is no political will to curb 
the corrupt state, no law is good enough. The law can be perfect but it will still not function if 
there is no will for it to be implemented and enforced.  
6.  Survey on public opinion on corruption and state capture 
I have analysed objective data on state capture as a ’framework’ to show that there is ongoing 
large-scale corruption. But for anti-corruption policies it is essential to know what the citizens, 
as the principle stakeholders, think about the mechanisms of state capture, how much they trust 
state institutions, how they judge ‘party’ job allocation in the public sector, what they think of 
the multi-functions held by the politicians and how they think corruption should be fought. I 
have divided the survey data on the public opinion of Serbian citizens into three sections: 1) 
concerns of the public about corruption and public confidence in the main state institutions and 
party leaderships; 2) judgment about the existing criteria for job allocation for the leading 
positions in public offices and what the criteria should be, including approval/disapproval on 
holding multi functions by politicians; and 3) tolerance and awareness of corruption in public 
offices, and what citizens think is the most efficient strategy to fight corruption in Serbia. 
Concerns about corruption and confidence in institutions 
The citizens of Serbia think that corruption is one of the four most important problems of the 
country. When citizens were asked to spontaneously choose the main problems Serbia is facing, 
the responses were the following: unemployment (55%), low standard of living (37%), Kosovo 
(23%) and corruption (28%).
64 High awareness of corruption has a direct impact on their trust in 
the main state institutions. Distrust of the institutions and the perception of them as being almost 
totally alienated from the interests of the citizens is alarming. Their answers to the question 
“which public institutions work for the interests of the citizens and for the general public good”, 
show extremely low confidence in the institutions: only 6% of the citizens think that political 
leaderships work for the public good; Parliament gets only 8% positive votes, ministers 9%, 
government 11%, courts 12%, local governments 15%, public companies 20% and so on. All 
the institutions have an overwhelmingly more negative trust vote than positive (see Figure 5). 
                                                 
63 Due to the new form prepared by Transparency Serbia to be used for the report of money collecting and 
spending during the January 2007 elections, more transparent reports are expected to be submitted 10 
days after the elections are held.  
64 The higher percentage of concern about corruption than about Kosovo was due to the ongoing 
corruption affairs that were being aired in public when the survey was going on; other survey data show 
that concern about Kosovo is higher than about corruption, but it does not change the estimation that 
corruption is among the four biggest problems of Serbia.  STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SERBIA | 27 
Figure 5. Do public institutions serve the interests of the citizens
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For whose interests are these institutions and organisations working? Using a scale from 1- 5 for 
each selected state office, the results are extremely worrying. A great majority of people, 71%, 
think that state offices work in their own interests, 70% say that they work for their parties, 69% 
say they work for their relatives and friends, and the same amount think that they work for 
“powerful people and businessmen”. Only 13% said that state offices work in the interests of the 
citizens! 
In response to direct questions about the public organisation or office in which corruption is the 
most widespread (using a scale of 1-5 for each institution), 77% think that the political parties 
are the most corrupt, doctors and MPs tied for second place with 75%, and so on (see Figure 6).  28 | VESNA PESIC 
Figure 6. How widespread is corruption among the following organisations and groups?
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Appointments to public offices 
Citizens have a realistic perception about how positions in public offices are filled, confirming 
my research data. When asked about how appointments should be made, the response was 
almost totally opposite to the practice in reality. The citizens indicated that merit-based 
appointments should be the most important criteria used. More than 90% said that it should be 
the first criteria taken into account (Figure 8). A dramatically different picture was given about 
how they view the practice to be in reality. Citizen responses estimated that party membership 
and family/friendship ties are the most used criteria (77% and 76%, Figure 7), while merit and 
qualifications play a much lesser role in the selection process. 
Figure 7. Criteria used for appointments of leading positions
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Figure 8. Criteria that should be used for appointments for leading 
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Perceptions about the procedures for recruiting for jobs in public offices show that 49% of the 
citizens think that advertisements for public office positions do not exist, and that the parties 
independently allocate these positions to their own people within party coalition agreements. A 
total of 40% think that when positions are advertised, the competition is fixed in advance. Only 
8% of the citizens interviewed think that public advertisements of positions and the opportunity 
to apply are accessible to everyone.  
The general public perceives the holding of multiple functions by politicians to be a negative 
practice and a problem. Over 90% of the total sample of citizens had this point of view. Among 
responses regarding multiple functions, 27% said that this phenomenon was caused by greed for 
money (to have many sources of income); 24% said that it is a problem because it is not 
possible to exercise so many functions and to perform them properly and in the interest of 
citizens; 20% estimated that multiple functions mean a concentration of power in fewer hands 
and that it is not democratic; 19% estimated that multiple functions give too much power to the 
parties. Only 9% said that having multiple functions is not a problem if someone is sufficiently 
capable of fulfilling them all in a proper way. 
Citizens also disapprove of the practice that highly-positioned statesmen/women are 
simultaneously playing active, high-level roles in their respective parties. Some 54% of the 
sample disapproved of the practice, 29% expressed their disapproval only for the highest 
positions (Prime Minister, President and ministers) and 15% think that having both an active 
party function and a state duty or duties does not influence the effectiveness of their 
performances of both roles.  
Tolerance of corruption in public offices and the efficient anti-corruption 
strategy 
The citizens of Serbia are very sensitive to and intolerant of corruption. They said that if they 
knew that a politician from the party s/he usually votes for was corrupt, s/he would go to the 
party to denounce him (34% of the answers), 33% would not vote (would abstain), 22% would 
vote for some other party and 4% said that in spite of the corruption they would vote for their 
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Other indicators on the same issue once again demonstrated a high sensitivity to and intolerance 
of corruption. Citizens claimed that they would immediately denounce someone who would ask 
for a bribe, but my opinion is that this is an overestimated expression of action that would not 
really be carried out when faced with bribery. In response to a question about the relative 
corruption of political bodies (saying that political corruption is the same in developed countries 
but did not prevent them from developing), 45% strongly disagreed with such a statement, while 
only 13% agreed (the others did not express an opinion). 
As to why corruption is not being eradicated, 46% of the respondents expressed the view that 
the state is doing little to curb corruption because corruption is located in the state organs, while 
21% felt that institutions such as the courts, inspections and budget controlling mechanisms are 
not working and a lesser number that said that there was no money to fight corruption, that 
political parties are not giving enough support and citizens are not supportive. 
What do citizens think would be the most efficient policy to fight corruption? They mainly gave 
three largely substantiated answers. First, special and independent bodies must be created to 
fight corruption as the only focus; second, the rule of law and independent courts must be 
strengthened, and third, internal and external controls must be established for all public 
institutions together with sanctions for those who violate the rules and standards in the public 
sector. A small number, about 5% each, mentioned the need to increase the involvement of all 
citizens, the need to prohibit multiple functions, the need to introduce obligatory standards of 
behaviour for all public servants and the need to develop investigative journalism. 
7.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
General conclusions 
The complex transition process in Serbia remains overloaded with the specific problems of the 
past decades. Among these problems is the large-scale corruption that has survived during the 
six years since Milosevic was ousted from power. In the post-Milosevic period, Serbia has 
passed many laws and new institutions have been established to fight corruption. But the result 
is unsatisfactory, mainly because the laws are deficient (or improperly implemented), 
institutions are weak, and controlling mechanisms are almost non-existent. During the post-
Milosevic period, there has been a tendency to install state capture as the corrupt and non-
transparent norm of public sector governance in Serbia. This trend is due to the growing 
stabilisation of an oligarchic social structure and the loss of a strong pro-European and reformist 
policy-orientation in government. Serbia has not yet established differentiating lines to separate 
political and economic sectors. The high convertibility of influences between them has created a 
non-transparent and unaccountable government, undermining the main state institutions, 
including the judiciary, the Parliament and the principal regulatory and controlling institutions. 
This politically dominated system has created a framework for systemic corruption.  
Accompanying these typical ‘transitional’ problems are the specific difficulties that Serbia has 
in complying with its international obligations to extradite Ratko Mladic and other accused 
Serbs to the ICTY for war crimes. The postponing of this obligation has held up the negotiations 
with the EU about the Stabilisation and Association (S&A) agreement with Serbia, curtailing, at 
least temporarily, the EU influence on institution building in Serbia. The lack of ‘political will’ 
for serious institution-building in the area of judiciary independence, professionalism, good 
governance and accountable executive organs has been clearly demonstrated. Unrestrained 
political leadership in Serbia has converted, to a great extent, the multi-party system into a rigid, 
party-feudal governance over public institutions and citizen interests. This conversion was 
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influence and all public institutions for political elite interests, and trades them for the 
illegitimate needs of privileged business (tycoons) in return for secret financing.  
In summary, the results of my research on state capture and my survey of public opinion have 
demonstrated the following practical problems relevant for policy options:  
1)  Tycoons have become part of the system (government) by buying political influence to 
ensure their monopolies (which keep prices higher
65), getting favourable laws and various 
privileges. 
2)  There has been an increase in discretional decision-making of the ministers and 
government. 
3)  The administration of tax, customs, police, services and utilities, etc. has become highly 
politicised. 
4)  Multiple functions, exaggerated immunity, dismissing MPs from parliament, mingling of 
the highest party and state functions and ownership of the mandates by the parties all 
indicate the formation of an oligarchic political structure. 
5)  Political/party influence over the new regulatory institutions has been expanded by 
corrupting their control mechanisms, their selection processes, or simply, by delaying their 
establishment. 
6)  Power has been concentrated in the executive branch enabling it to subjugate the parliament 
and the judiciary system to such a degree that there is no effective control mechanism over 
government.
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7)  Citizens have lost confidence in all public institutions and in politicians because of state 
capture mechanisms i.e. their imposing their own interests over public interests. 
Policy options and recommendations  
The main policy problem is: How can legal limits and effective control be established over the 
currently-unrestrained party leaderships in managing the public sector and public interests? The 
policy should constructively lead to the creation of good governance institutions and a 
supportive legal environment rather than focus entirely on the negative consequences of the 
system’s illness. To investigate these opportunities, I will mention the positive elements of the 
changes that have occurred in the post-Milosevic era and point out public actors who could 
implement new policies to curb state capture. These positive elements for policy changes are: 
-  Economic reforms have not been discontinued during these six years (a short break was 
visible during 2004, especially in privatisation), which leaves the door open to the 
development of liberal, competitive markets and the completion of the privatisation process. 
Progress in this area will reduce the extensive state interference in the economy, diminish 
the power of monopolies and the seeking of ‘favours’ for business, and will augment the 
shift towards a new style of entrepreneurship and corporate business based on law and 
markets. 
-  Political competitiveness has not been completely eliminated; there is still room for new 
political alternatives. There are important differences in the main political orientations of 
                                                 
65 The daily paper Politika made an experiment comparing basic food prices in the Czech Republic and 
Serbia: the conclusion was that in Serbia the prices are almost twice as high due to the monopolies.  
66 For just this reason, the President of the Anti-corruption Council, Verica Barac, in her last 
announcement said that the government became “the centre of power and corruption”, quoted from 
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existing parties, giving citizens the opportunity to vote for those which are reformist and EU 
oriented.
67 
-  Despite some negative actions of the government against the NGOs, they are growing 
stronger, raising their leadership capacities and strengthening their potential for influence by 
forming coalitions, engaging in joint actions, and cooperating with the new control 
institutions such as the Ombudsman for Information.
68 Investigative journalism is just 
beginning but it has already produced some positive results.
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-  Institution-building and the development of a legal framework in the area of good 
governance is under way, but it needs to be continued, improved, implemented and 
monitored. 
-  Citizen awareness about corruption and state capture mechanisms is growing. They are the 
most important stakeholders and they need to establish alliances for combating extreme 
party/government power so that more accountable and transparent governance can be 
established in Serbia. 
Based on the findings of the research and the positive tendencies that now exist for combating 
state capture, it is evident that if policy strategy is to be effective, it must be simultaneously 
carried out on three different policy levels. The first refers to the international level. In the 
context of Serbia’s ambition to join the EU integration, the focal point must be to renew the 
suspended S&A negotiations with the EU. The condition for lifting the suspension should be 
Serbia’s full commitment to its international obligations by extraditing Mladic and others 
accused of war crimes to the ICTY. Without opening up and making firm progress on the road 
to EU integration, it is highly unlikely that significant results can be produced on the second and 
third levels of policy for combating state capture and systemic corruption. EU support for wider 
political, economic and institution-building reforms is essential. The second policy cluster refers 
to the institutional and legal improvements that must be introduced in the area of fighting 
corruption in order to achieve the goal of reaching the benchmark of corruption reduction to 
grade 5 measured by the TI CPI index (which signifies bearable corruption). The third level of 
policy measures requires activating the society, civic organisations, professional associations, 
media and NGOs to a sufficient degree so that they can exert effective, systematic external 
pressure on the government to bring about its accountability, transparency and responsiveness to 
the citizens’ needs and interests.  
On the first level policy, to break through the political stalemate of Serbia’s international 
obligations, the following EU policies are recommended: 
1.  Actively support the pro-European democratic forces and the civil sector aiming to 
marginalise the old nationalistic forces, which are the anchor of the state capture system and 
anti-European values and institutions. 
2.  Urgently demand that the new Serbian Government (to be formed after the elections in 
January 2007), extradite Ratko Mladic and other accused Serbs to the ICTY (International 
                                                 
67 As has been shown, there is a substantive difference between the way the Democratic Party and the 
Democratic party of Serbia would lead the government, although they are both considered to be part of 
the ‘democratic bloc’.  
68 Some NGOs protested against the replacement of the Ombudsman for Information during the first 
session of the new Parliament. They had a very fruitful cooperation with the Ombudsman on several 
occasions. 
69 The TV show “Insider” of the B 92 TV Station is such a case. It has revealed all kinds of misdeeds of 
the government, especially in the area of police actions, security agencies, courts and prosecution cases, 
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), in order to continue the negotiation process 
with the EU. The fulfilment of this obligation to the ICTY would give enormous potential to 
Serbia to eradicate the secretive state bodies of the old regime in the police and military, 
which are the true stakeholders of state capture, nationalistic manipulation and anti-
European policies. 
3.  Strongly support Serbia’s EU integration process, irrespective of the present ambivalence 
about future EU enlargement. The integration process in itself, with its insistence on 
political and economic reforms, free trade, and institution building, is more important than 
the final goal of becoming a full member of the EU, although the goal has to remain 
tangible because of its motivational effects for sustainable reforms and changes. 
Second level polices, refer to the institution-building of good governance, derived from the 
analysis of state capture mechanisms and consequences. The following policies are 
recommended:  
4.  Establish control mechanisms without delay in all areas of public and private sectors where 
they are missing. This includes the implementation of already-existing laws. The State 
Audit Institution must be established and given real authority to audit all public budgets. 
The Agency for Fighting Corruption, the Ombudsperson, and the Civil Service Agency 
must also be implemented. The latter is provisioned by the Law on State Administration. It 
will promote professionalism and the complete de-politisation of state administration on all 
levels and sectors, requiring that all appointments be advertised and presented to the public. 
5.  Introduce an Ethics Code in all public institutions, giving particular weight to the ethical 
behaviour of MPs, government officials, judges, prosecutors, presidents of controlling 
boards of the regulatory institutions etc. The purpose is to raise the consciousness of ethical 
standards and increase the effectiveness of the public sector. It is needed to introduce the 
permanent education of public functionaries and civil servants in the domain of good 
governance. Themes covered should include the prevention of conflict of interests and the 
obligation to inform the public about topics of public interest, and about the need for 
citizens and professionals to participate in the drafting of new legislation. 
6.  Eliminate the possibility of lobbying the government regarding customs taxes, petroleum 
excise taxes, transfers to municipalities, credits, etc. Eliminate the discretional decision-
making of ministries and governments and base them on law. 
7.  Improve the already-existing laws and their regulatory bodies and adapt them to EU 
standards so that they may be more effective in their control of executive/political 
influences and may prevent their collusion with private business. In particular, the new Law 
on Financing Political Parties should be drawn up and submitted to the Parliament and an 
effective control body should be set up for its implementation. 
8.  Advocate improvements in the Law on Conflicts of Interest which was passed with many 
defects. It must cover all functionaries, it must prohibit multiple public functions for the 
MPs and other government officials and it has to professionalise the Board for the 
Prevention of the Conflicts of Interest.  
9.  Improve competition policy and eliminate monopolies and privileges in the Serbian 
economy by introducing more effective ‘anti monopoly’ control bodies, by expediting 
privatisation procedures, by legislating free trade policies and by signing free-trade 
agreements. 
10. Develop effective strategies for the selling of shares of public companies (which do not deal 
with natural recourses) in order to introduce responsible, efficient, and merit-based 
management instead of present party cronyism and nepotism.  34 | VESNA PESIC 
The third level policies emanate from the survey data I have presented showing the 
dissatisfaction of citizens with public-sector ineffectiveness and widespread corruption. They 
include: 
11. Build up civil society’s capacities and promote NGOs’ alliances to organise public debates 
about party-conditioned distributions of leading positions in the public sector and 
discrimination on the basis of political convictions. 
12. Organise campaigns against multiple functions. Advocate eliminating the mingling of state 
and party functions at the highest levels. Prohibit the ‘feudal division’ of the executive 
power in the new government which will be formed after elections. 
13. Initiate public dialogues with the more open-minded political parties about changes in 
election laws, in order to strengthen the role of the parliament, increase the responsibility 
and professionalisation of the MPs, reduce the scope of their immunity, and enhance 
citizen-MP relations in proposing, implementing and monitoring the laws in the area of 
good governance and corruption prevention. 
14. Enhance investigative journalism and public dialogues about state capture and good 
governance topics, as well as about corruption. Support the journalist profession in defence 
of the freedom of expression. Advocate real independence of the news media, TV and radio 
public services. Do not allow them to be an extended arm of the government. 
15. Make alliances between the independent regulatory bodies (agencies) and NGOs. Facilitate 
their joint role as strategic partners in fulfilling their social roles including providing 
education and training and monitoring of the effectiveness of the new institutions.  
Our research and survey data will hopefully serve to convince politicians and government 
officials to take into account public opinion and the almost total distrust that citizens have 
towards political institutions and political leaderships. This is leading to an alarming alienation 
of the citizens from the political system. The systematic and sustainable external influence of 
the civic organisations and NGOs can bring about the changes that are needed in the leadership 
of Serbia. 35 | 
Annex I. Survey Methodology 
•  Time frame: Research was conducted during the period of 20-24 July 2006. 
•  Population: Serbia (excluding Kosovo) 18+ years of age 
•  Sample size: 1027  
•  Sample type: Three-stage random representative stratified sample 
o  Primary stage units: Polling stations territories 
o  Secondary stage units: Households (SRSWoR – random walk) 
o  Tertiary stage units: Respondents within the household (Kish tables) 
•  Research sites: 67 municipalities in Serbia, 127 local communities, urban, peripheral and 
rural neighbourhoods 
•  Stratification: gender, age and region 
•  Sampling error: 
±1.23% for incidence 5% 
±2.45% for incidence 25% 
±2.82% for incidence 50% (marginal error) 